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THE "WORK FOR HIRE" DEFINITION IN THE
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976: CONFLICT OVER
SPECIALLY ORDERED OR COMMISSIONED
WORKS
The work for hire doctrine developed as a theory of ownership
entitling an employer to the copyrights of work prepared by an em-
ployee within the scope of his employment. In the Copyright Act of
1976 (the "1976 Act") Congress statutorily defined works made for
hire to include for the first time certain types of works "specially
ordered or commissioned."' The interpretation of this new statu-
tory definition is the source of controversy among the federal
courts.t
At common law2 and under the Copyright Act,3 the fundamen-
tal legal question involved in every work for hire of 1909 (the "1909
Act") controversy was whether an employer should acquire, by the
mere existence of an employment relationship, the immediate re-
sults of his employee's work as well as the copyrights to that work.
The answer inevitably depended upon the courts' interpretation of
the term "employee" under the work for hire doctrine. Courts for-
mulated several standards for making that determination.4
Now, however, the 1976 Act's definition of "works made for
hire" raises an altogether new question of ownership. Under the
In the 1976 Act, Congress for the first time defined "works made for hire":
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribu-
tion to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovi-
sual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as
an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas,
if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that
the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of
the foregoing sentence, a "supplementary work" is a work prepared for
publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the
purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising,
commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as fore-
words, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial
notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies,
appendixes, and indexes, and an "instructional text" is a literary, picto-
rial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of
use in systematic instructional activities.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
t As this Note was printed the United States Supreme Court resolved the con-
trovery. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S.Ct. 2166 (1989).
2 See infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
3 See infra text accompanying notes 26-46.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 26-32.
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revised definition, are courts to decide at what point, if any, an in-
dependent contractor is so controlled by the commissioning party
that he loses his independent status and becomes an employee for
purposes of the work for hire doctrine? Or does the revised defini-
tion eliminate such speculation by the court and establish a per se
rule based on the type of work created?
There are two interpretations of the specially ordered or com-
missioned works in clause two5 of the definition of works made for
hire.6 One line of cases7 interprets clause two as the exclusive test
for determining the work made for hire status of commissioned
works: if the work is not within one of clause two's nine specified
categories and specifically designated a work for hire by the re-
quired writing, then it is not a work made for hire. This "exclusive"
interpretation supports the theory that Congress intended to radi-
cally change the work for hire doctrine in the 1976 Act by limiting
the types of commissioned works eligible for work for hire status.8
The second line of cases9 expresses a more conservative view of the
specially ordered or commissioned works category. Under this
"non-exclusive" interpretation, commissioned works outside the
nine categories of works in clause two can still qualify as works made
for hire if the project was performed pursuant to basic standards of
agency law.' 0
Part I of this Note discusses the evolution of the work for hire
doctrine, with particular emphasis on the legislative history underly-
ing the 1976 Act. Part II analyzes the two opposing interpretations
of the 1976 Act's definition of works made for hire in light of com-
peting policy arguments. Based on this analysis, Part III endorses
the "exclusive" interpretation of the definition, arguing that, de-
spite the lack of clearly articulated Congressional intent, the 1976
Act radically changed the concept of work for hire as it applies to
commissioned works.
5 See supra note 1.
6 See O'Meara, "'orks Made for Hire" Under the Copyright Act of 1976-Two Interpreta-
tions, 15 CREiGHTON L. REV. 523 (1982) (acknowledging two interpretations of works
made for hire).
7 See infra notes 104-39 and accompanying text.
8 1 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 5.03 [A], at 5-10 (1981). See generally Angel & Tan-
nenbaum, Works Made for Hire Under S.22, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 209 (1976) (arguing
that new definitions of works for hire under § 101 should narrow the potential areas of
dispute).
9 See infra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
10 See Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 982 (1984); see also infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
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I
THE EVOLUTION OF THE WORK FOR HIRE DOCTRINE
A. The Work For Hire Doctrine Under the Common Law
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to protect
authors' efforts by securing to them the exclusive rights to their in-
tellectual labors."l The Copyright Clause expresses the belief that
protecting authors' rights is the best means to encourage and ad-
vance the arts. 12 Early legislative enactments of copyright law re-
flected that basic purpose.' 3 Yet, in the late 1800s federal courts
began to formulate an equitable theory of ownership that vested all
copyrights in an employer rather than in the actual "author" in the
case of works made for hire.' 4 While earlier courts tended to nar-
rowly construe any principle that deprived an author of copyrights
without his express consent, the courts of the new industrial age
viewed the employer-employee relationship as a manifestation of an
employee's "express consent" to pass his copyrights to his
employer. 15
This novel "consent" theory may at first appear to contradict
the basic protectionist purpose of the Copyright Clause by divesting
the creator of his copyrights in the finished product. The courts,
however, theorized that vesting the copyrights in the employer
rather than the employee is wholly consistent with the policy behind
the Copyright Clause.' 6 The courts reasoned that because the crea-
tivity and originality of the project flows directly from the employer,
the employer is the true author of the work. 17 Therefore, entitling
the employer to the copyrights of works made for hire fulfills the
basic purpose of copyright law, which is to create the most efficient
and productive balance between protecting an author's rights,
thereby providing him with appropriate incentives to continue his
I I U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 provides Congress with the power to ". . . Promote
the Progress of Science ... by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings .. "
12 See Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831 and H.R. 6835 Before Subcomm.
No. 3 of the House Comm. on theJudiday, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1 95 (1966).
13 The first copyright law of the United States was enacted by the first Congress in
1790 and revised in 1831, 1870, and 1909. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982) confers exclusive
jurisdiction to federal courts in the area of patents and copyrights.
14 Prior to the 1909 Act's codification of the work for hire doctrine, an employer
was presumed to own the copyright to the products of salaried employees. See, e.g.,
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); Colliery Engineer Co. v.
United Correspondence Schools Co., 94 F. 152 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899); Little v. Gould, 15
F. Cas. 612 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1852) (No. 8395).
15 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 245, 248 (1903).
16 Id. at 248 ("[T]he designs belonged to the plaintiffs [employers], they having
been produced by persons employed and paid by the plaintiffs in their establishment to
make those very things.").
17 Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426, 436 (1896).
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creative efforts, and disseminating an author's work, thereby pro-
moting societal learning, culture, and development.' 8
B. The Work For Hire Doctrine Under the Copyright Act of
1909
Congress first codified the work for hire doctrine in the Federal
Copyright Act of 1909.19 The 1909 Act defined "author" to include
an employer in the case of any work made for hire.20 The Act failed,
however, to define the term "work for hire," or to distinguish em-
ployees from independent contractors. As a result, courts had to
develop a definition of work made for hire in light of the 1909 Act.
More precisely, courts needed to decide whether an independent
contractor could be a statutory employee for the purposes of works
made for hire.
1. Significance of the Work For Hire Determination
The determination that a work was made for hire under the
1909 Act had a critical effect on ownership rights and related issues,
such as duration and renewal rights.2' Because copyrights initially
vest in the author of a work, and the Act provided that the term
"author" included an employer in the case of a work made for hire,
employers in the work for hire context became initial copyright
owners. The work for hire employer thereby received all rights
under the Copyright Act: ownership of the original work and any
work derived from the original and exploitation of the work in other
media. 22
In addition to the usage rights associated with initial ownership,
18 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 239; see also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973)
(Copyright Clause describes Congress' objective to promote the progress of science and
the arts and encourage people to pursue intellectual and artistic creation by granting to
those individuals the exclusive rights to their works); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954) (Copyright Clause reflects an economic philosophy that "encouragement of indi-
vidual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and Useful Arts' ").
19 Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90
Stat. 2541 (1976).
20 Id. 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1947) provided "an author or proprietor" the right to secure a
copyright. The Act also defined an "author" to include an employer in the case of works
made for hire.
21 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1947).
22 This distinction is particularly important with respect to foreign employers
and/or authors because they are not subject to the manufacturing clause (17 U.S.C. § 16
(1947)), limiting importation and distribution of copies manufactured abroad, and ad
interim provisions (17 U.S.C. §§ 22, 23 (1947)), imposing a five year cut off of copyright
protection of copies manufactured abroad. Thus, if an American citizen is hired to de-
velop a work for a foreign company, the foreign employer/author would be entitled to
copyrights under the 1909 Act with no obligation to comply with the same requirements
as American authors. See NIMMER, supra note 8, § 5.03[A], at 5-I1 n.l I.
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only the author or his family could renew the copyright. The Act
provided that the proprietor of any "work copyrighted by . . . an
employer for whom such work is made for hire" 23 shall be entitled
to renew and extend the copyright for an additional 28 years.24
Thus, under the 1909 Act, it was crucial to determine the relation-
ship between the creator of the work and anyone to whom he may
have divested his rights in the original copyright term. If the courts
determined that a work for hire relationship was one of "employ-
ment," then the employee-creator automatically divested himself of
the renewal rights in favor of the employer or the employer's suc-
cessor in interest, absent any agreement to the contrary.25
2. Whose Work Is Made For Hire?
a. Works Made Under an Employer-Employee Relationship
Under the 1909 Act, the courts determined that an employer
held the copyright to an employee's work created within the "scope
of his employment." 26 Relevant factors courts used in determining
whether a work was made within the scope of employment included
the existence of an employment contract, 27 at whose instance, ex-
pense, time, and facility the work was created, 28 and the nature and
amount of compensation, if any, received by the employee for his
work.29 The standard agency inquiry, however, remained the pri-
mary test for determining the existence of an employment relation-
ship: did the employer have a right to direct and supervise the
23 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1947).
24 Id.
25 NiMMER, supra note 8, § 5.03[A], at 5-10.
26 See, e.g., Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640, 651 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (essential factors for determining whether work was made within the scope of
employment were employer's rights to supervise, direct, and exercise control over the
work).
27 See NIMMER, supra note 8, § 5.03[B], at 5-13.
28 See Siegel v. National Periodical Publications, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir.
1974) (holding that no work for hire arrangement existed between the creator of a comic
strip and the magazine that published it because the comic strip was "spawned" prior to
any relationship with the publisher. Since the creation of the strip was not at the "in-
stance and expense" of the publisher, the publisher could not claim any copyright in the
strip); Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1217 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 997 (1972); Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565,
567-69 (2d Cir. 1966).
29 See Bourne, 314 F. Supp. at 650-51; see also Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307
(5th Cir. 1978) (share of profits); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 123 F.2d 697 (2d
Cir. 1941) (advance payment against royalty); Tobani v. Carl Fischer, Inc., 98 F.2d 57
(2d Cir. 1938) (one may be an employee regardless of whether he is paid on a piece by
piece basis or a conventional salary); Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (no compensation at all). Brown v.
Select Theatres Corp., 56 F. Supp. 438 (D. Mass. 1944) (advance payment against
royalty).
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performance of the work?30
Using the above standards, courts interpreting the 1909 Act
created a rebuttable presumption that, absent evidence of any con-
trary agreement between the parties, the copyright to the completed
work vested in the employer as the statutory author.31 Basic con-
cepts of equity justified this presumption. Because the employer di-
rected and supervised the production of the work and bore the
financial risks, it was only fair that the employer should reap the
benefits of the finished product.3 2
b. Works Made Under a Hiring Party-Independent Contractor
Relationship
Although the 1909 Act included "employers" in the definition
of author, it did not include commissioning parties. Likewise,
whether the Act's work for hire provision was broad enough to
cover an independent contractor's work was also unclear. Because
the Act failed to address commissioned works, a question arose
whether independent contractors could be considered statutory em-
ployees since, unlike ordinary employees, they are not necessarily
subject to an employer's control. 33 That issue was resolved by the
following gradual succession of case law.
30 See NIMMER, supra note 8, § 5.03[B], at 5-11, 5-12; see, e.g., Donaldson Publishing
Co. v. Bregman, Vocco & Conn, Inc., 375 F.2d 639, 643 (2d Cir. 1967) (when songwriter
hired to compose music was not subject to employer's right "to direct and supervise the
manner in which the writer perform[ed] his work," he "was not an 'employee' in the
substantial sense required by the Copyright Act"), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1036 (1968); see
also Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307, 1310-1311 (5th Cir. 1978) (author hired to
write menu book was employee because hiring party had the right to direct and super-
vise the manner in which the work was performed); Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc.,
457 F.2d 1213, 1217 (2d Cir.) (parties who commissioned songwriter owned the copy-
right because they "controlled the original song" and had power to "accept, reject, or
modify her work"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972).
31 See, e.g., May v. Morganelli-Heumann and Assocs., 618 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1980);
Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1978); Scherr v. Universal Match Corp.,
417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969); Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp.,
369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 933
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 517 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1975); Charron v. Meaux,
60 F.R.D. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Royalty Control Corp. v. Sanco, Inc., 175 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 641 (N.D. Cal. 1972); IrvingJ. Dorfman Co. v. Borlan Indus., Inc., 309 F. Supp.
21 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); VanCleef and Arpels, Inc. v. Schechter, 308 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Kinelow Publishing Co. v. Photography in Business, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 851
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Electronic Publishing Co., v. Zalytron Tube Corp., 151 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
613 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aft'd, 376 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1967). See also NIMMER, supra note 8,
§ 5.03[D], at 5-27 ("[Ilnitial ownership of rights in a work made for hire are only pre-
sumed to be in the employer (or commissioning party), which presumption may be re-
butted by an express agreement in writing between the parties.").
32 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
33 B. VARMER, WORKS MADE FOR HIRE AND ON COMMISSION, SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDY 13, at 142 (1958).
The differences in type of payment or regularity of working hours be-
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Very few early cases involved commissioned works. However,
those that did involved one-time works such as portraits, photo-
graphs and works of art, and generally held that the copyright
vested in the person who commissioned the work.34
In Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co. ,35 the Second Circuit presumed
that any person who commissions another to create a copyrightable
work is the statutory "author."3 6 Without reference to the concept
of "work for hire," the court held that under general contract law
principles the commissioning party is presumed "to control the
publication of copies.., unless by the terms of the contract, express
or implicit, the artist has reserved the copyright to himself."37 This
contractual assignment theory did not extend so far as to call the
commissioning party the statutory author of the work because the
court merely interpreted the contract, not the statute. Thus, the
commissioning party's copyright under the assignment theory was
not as extensive as the copyright that vested in an employer under
the work for hire presumption.3 8
In Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp. ,9 the court
merged the Yardley presumption into the work for hire doctrine. 40
tween the employment and commission situations would not seem to be
crucial reasons for different treatment....
However, the common law generally has differentiated between the
employer-employee relationship and that of the parties to a contract for a
commissioned product: in broad terms, the acts of an employee as such
are imputed to his employer, but those of an independent contractor are
not imputed to the person for whom he performs a special commission.
Underlying this distinction is the premise that an employer generally
gives more direction and exercises more control over the work of his em-
ployee than does a commissioner with respect to the work of an in-
dependent contractor. Perhaps in recognition of this principle, the
statutory provisions in the United States regarding the employer's owner-
ship of copyright in works made for hire... have not been extended to
commissioned works generally.
34 See Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965); Yar-
dley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686
(1940); Lumiere v. Robertson-Cole Distrib. Corp., 280 F. 550 (2d Cir. 1922); Dielman v.
White, 102 F. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900); Grant v. Kellogg Co., 58 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y.
1944); Tumey v. Little, 18 Misc.2d 462, 186 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1959). But see Uproar Co. v.
National Broadcasting Co., 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1936).
35 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686 (1940).
36 Id. at 31 (copyright in mural belonged to commissioning party, not painter).
37 Id.
38 Because the buyer in Yardley was merely an assignee and not the statutory au-
thor, he did not possess copyright renewal rights. Rather, the seller (an independent
contractor) had the right to renew the copyright. Cf Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v.Jerry
Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569, 570 (2d Cir. 1955) (holding that the buyer was the
author under the work for hire language of the 1909 Act).
39 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966).
40 Id. at 567-68. The district courts within the Circuit followed Brattleboro, applying
the work for hire doctrine to employer/independent contractor relationships. See, e.g.,
Goldman-Morgen, Inc. v. Dan Brechner & Co., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 382, 391 (S.D.N.Y.
1989] 565
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The rule that the employer is the statutory author of a work made
for hire now included the presumption that a commissioning party
is the statutory author of the commissioned work.4 1 Thus, in Brat-
tleboro, the advertisers who paid a newspaper's staff to design adver-
tisements it later reprinted in a competitor's newspaper were the
statutory authors for purposes of determining copyright ownership.
The court found that the work for hire doctrine, by which an em-
ployer is presumed to own the copyright "whenever the employee's
work is produced at the instance and expense of his employer," ap-
plied where the parties bear the relationship of commissioning party
and independent contractor.42
Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc.43 affirmed the broad standard
enunciated in Brattleboro. There the court held that the parties who
commissioned a songwriter to assist in the adaptation of the song,
"Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf?," owned the copyright. 44 Ap-
plying the Brattleboro standard, the court determined that the pa-
trons owned the copyright because "[t]hey controlled the original
song, they took the initiative in engaging [the songwriter] to adapt
it, and they had the power to accept, reject, or modify her work." 45
The expansion of the work for hire doctrine to commissioned
works precipitated uncertainty and potential abuse in the con-
tracting process between independent contractors and their com-
missioning parties. For example, commissioning parties could now
acquire copyrights that were not contemplated at the time of con-
tracting, and thus not reflected in the agreed-upon price for the
work, simply by exercising greater supervision during the work pro-
cess. This exploitation of authors was a major motivating force be-
hind the 1976 revision of the work for hire doctrine.
46
1976); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 933, 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 517 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1975); IrvingJ. Dorfman Co. v. Borlan Indus.,
Inc., 309 F. Supp. 21, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
41 Brattleboro, 369 F.2d at 567. But see id. at 569 (Lumbard, CJ., concurring) (dis-
agreeing with presumption "that one who commissions a work owns the copyright
... .11).
42 Id. at 568 ("We see no sound reason why these same principles are not applica-
ble when the parties bear the relationship of employer and independent contractor.").
The court implied that the newspaper's staff were mere employees working pursuant to
their employers' (advertisers') control, direction, and expense. Id. Hence, a newspaper
company could not bring a copyright infringement suit upon a competitor who repli-
cated the newspapers' ads at the advertisers' insistence.
43 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972).
44 Id. at 1215 (commissioned contributor's work was done for hire within the Act's
definition of that term).
45 Id. at 1217.
46 See infra notes 53-89 and accompanying text.
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C. The Work For Hire Doctrine Under the Copyright Act of
1976
The copyright law revision was the result of a legislative process
that began with the Copyright Office Studies of 195547 and
culminated twenty-two years later with the Copyright Act of 1976.48
Given that 40 percent of copyrighted works in 1965 were "made for
hire,"49 artist groups and representatives of book publishers and
motion picture companies hotly debated the provisions pertaining
to this classification of works. 50 Although the work for hire provi-
sions in the 1976 Act represent a series of compromises among
these multiple concerns, 51 the language reflecting those com-
promises creates an ambiguity as to what works are actually covered
by the Act.52 To evaluate judicial attempts to resolve this ambiguity
in Part II of this Note, it is necessary first to review the key legisla-
tive references and discussions of the points compromised and how
the definition of "works made for hire" reflects those compromises.
1. The Legislative History of the Revised Work For Hire Provisions
The 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights 53 noted that
courts "have not generally regarded commissioned works as works
'made for hire.' -54 Thus, the preliminary draft of the revised Copy-
right Act defined a work made for hire as "a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of the duties of his employment, but not
including a work made on special order or commission." 55 This last
47 See Hearings on H.R. 9203 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations,
83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
48 Major revisions of the 1909 Act were made in 1961, 1963, 1964 and 1965. See
supra note 47 and infra notes 53-74 and accompanying text.
49 HOUSE CoMm. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89th CONG., Ist SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVI-
SION PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 92 (Comm. Print 1965)
[hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PT. 6].
50 Id. at 66.
51 Historical and Revision Note, Pub. L. 94-553, Title I, § 101, Oct. 19, 1976, 90
Stat. 2568: "The definition now provided by the bill represents a compromise which, in
effect, spells out those specific categories of commissioned works that can be considered
works made for hire under certain circumstances."
52 See Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 1987) ("The
more we examine the statute and cases interpreting it, the more puzzled we become.
The language of the statute is equivocal .... There are two completely distinct inter-
pretations of the statute ....").
53 HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAw REVI-
SION: REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAw (Comm. Print 1961).
54 COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, PT. 6, supra note 49, at 66.
55 HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAw REVI-
SION, PART 3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS 15 n.11 (Comm.
Print 1964) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, PT. 3].
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clause, however, aroused strong opposition from the publishing and
motion picture industries. 56
The publishing and motion picture industries asserted that ex-
clusion of specially ordered or commissioned works from the defini-
tion of works made for hire would create "insuperable obstacles"
and "major economic dislocation.- 57 They emphasized the practi-
cal problems that would arise if the publisher did not own the copy-
rights in collective works which require a high level of creativity on
the part of the publisher to compile the contributions.58 For exam-
ple, if encyclopedia were not covered under the work for hire provi-
sion, contributing authors would retain the right to terminate any
assignment of rights previously made to the publisher. This termi-
nation right would severely constrain the publisher's ability to revise
and update the original version.59
Moreover, the publishing and motion picture industries argued
that the legal and policy justifications behind the work for hire doc-
trine supported their view that the definition of works made for hire
should include certain commissioned works. 60 They argued that,
because a publisher or movie producer exercises the true creativity
in composite works, he should be considered the author for copy-
right purposes. 6 1 If the copyright did not vest in the commissioning
party, the transaction costs of dealing with multitudes of authors
would render the production of such works economically infeasi-
ble.62 In the end, one basic purpose of the Copyright Clause-to
disseminate information and thereby enhance learning-would be
frustrated. 63
In response to this criticism, the Copyright Office amended the
preliminary definition of works made for hire to include "a work
prepared on special order or commission if the parties expressly
56 HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVI-
SION, PART 4: FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT FROM RE-
VISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 274 (Comm. Print 1964) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION, PT. 4].
57 Id.
58 See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION, PART 5: 1964 REVISION BILL WITH DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS 149 (Comm.
Print 1964) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PT. 5].
59 Id. at 149-50 (To exempt specially ordered or commissioned works from the
definition of works made for hire "would result in negotiations for revision with respect
to anywhere from five to . . . ten thousand individual contributors to . . . composite
works and collective works . . . . [I]t would not be feasible for those works to be
published .... ).
60 COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PT. 6, supra note 49, at 66-67.
61 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
62 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
63 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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agree in writing that it shall be considered a work made for hire." 64
This amendment incensed authors' organizations who feared that
authors who agreed to do a specific project, with payment in ad-
vance royalties or on a lump sum basis, might be construed as work-
ing "on special order or commission," thereby losing all rights to
their work product.65 They feared that the proposed definition
would convert many works presently not considered works made for
hire to that status.66
In addition, the authors' representatives argued that the writing
requirement offered virtually no protection to authors. They
claimed that, because authors generally have no economic bargain-
ing power, they cannot insist on the exclusion of a clause that speci-
fies the work is made for hire.67 In time, clauses expressly stating
that the work was made for hire would become part of the standard
form contract. While admitting that authors often do not read their
agreements carefully, author organizations insisted that such valua-
ble rights should not hinge on such a technical point.68
The Revisory Committee thus faced the difficult task of deter-
mining which commissioned works should not be considered works
made for hire. The publishing and motion picture industries in-
sisted upon the treatment of certain works as made for hire. Exam-
ples of such works are translations, maps and illustrations in books,
front matter and appendices, contributions to dictionaries and ency-
clopedia, and parts of motion pictures.6 9 Both sides agreed, how-
ever, that many other works made on special order or commission
should not be elevated to work for hire status.7(° Examples of such
works included operas, choreographic schemes, novels, and
paintings. 7'
In light of the serious consequences envisioned by both sides of
the debate, defining works for hire was extremely problematic. Ar-
guably, to exclude commissioned works from the work for hire pro-
vision would cripple the production of and public access to
64 COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PT. 5, supra note 58, at 301.
65 COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, PT. 4, supra note 56, at 313-14.
66 COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PT. 5, supra note 58, at 239 ("Books are often pub-
lished under contracts executed before the work is written, or completed. These could
be deemed written 'on special order or commission'; but they are not now considered
'works made for hire.' ").
67 COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, PT. 4, supra note 56, at 313; COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION,
PT. 5, supra note 58, at 239.
68 COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, PT. 5, supra note 58, at 147.
69 COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, PT. 6, supra note 49, at 67.
70 Id.; see also COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, PT. 5, supra note 58, at 145 ("There are
commissioned works, such as operas and serious music, and various works of that sort
that most people would find hard to accept as 'works made for hire.' ").
71 COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, PT. 5, supra note 58, at 145; COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION,
Pr. 6, supra note 49, at 67.
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composite works; 72 yet, to include commissioned works would jeop-
ardize authors' due rights. 73 In an effort to reconcile these conflicts,
the 1965 bill defined a work made for hire as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his em-
ployment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contri-
bution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture, as a
translation, or as a supplementary work,74 if the parties expressly
agree in writing that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire.75
Although the definition that was adopted added a few impor-
tant categories of work to this definition, 76 the 1965 bill truly repre-
sents the culmination of years of study, consultation and debate.
Under clause two of the 1976 Act's definition, to qualify as a work
made for hire a specially ordered or commissioned 77 work must fall
within one of the specified categories, 78 and must be designated a
72 See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
73 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
74 See COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PT. 6, supra note 49, at 67, defining the term "sup-
plementary work" as:
... a work prepared for publication adjunct to a work by an author for the
purpose of introducing, illustrating, explaining, commenting upon, or as-
sisting in the use of the other work, such as forewards, introductions,
prefaces, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, tests
and answers, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes.
75 Id.
76 See supra note I.
77 Throughout the revisions of the work for hire definition, there is no definition of
"specially ordered or commissioned works." However, the legislative history indicates
that the term refers only to those specified categories of works and not to commissioned
works in general. Congress believed that only those nine categories of specially ordered
or commissioned works bore significant indicia of "employment" to constitute a work
for hire:
The status of works prepared on special order or commission has been a
continuing issue in the development of the definition of "work made for
hire." The basic position of book publishers and certain other groups on
this issue has been that, while some commissioned works concededly
should not be regarded as made for hire, there are others to which all of
the factors calling for special treatment of works made for hire apply with
full force. They argued that, in the case of a wide range of works ... the
distinction between "employment" or "commission" is fundamentally
meaningless, since in either case the work is prepared at the employer's
initiative and risk and under his direction.
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PT. 6, supra note 49, at 67 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (submitted with H.R. 4347) and S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at
114-16 (1967)).
78 See id. at 67-68:
The thought here is that, in the ... special cases specifically mentioned,
the work will be considered a "work made for hire," but only if it is in fact
"specifically ordered or commissioned" for that purpose and if there is
an express agreement in writing that the work be considered "made for
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work for hire in a written instrument signed by both parties.79
2. The Definition of Works Made For Hire in the Copyright Act of
1976
The 1976 Act adopted the basic principle of the work for hire
doctrine.80 Under clause one of section 101, any work made by an
employee in the scope of his or her employment is made for hire.8'
Clause one adopts the 1909 Act's definition of works made for hire.
Like the 1909 Act, this clause makes no provision for the treatment
of independent contractors.
Clause two,8 2 however, departs from the 1909 Act's definition
of works made for hire. For the first time in copyright law, Congress
distinguished works produced by traditional employees from those
produced by independent contractors. 83 Under clause two, three
facts must be established before a commissioned work may be
deemed a work made for hire: (a) the work must be specially or-
dered or commissioned; (b) the work must fall within one of the
nine specified categories; and (c) both parties must expressly agree
in writing that the work is made for hire.8 4
Thus, clause one retains the basic premise of the 1909 work for
hire doctrine while clause two reflects an effort to differentiate the
works of traditional employees from those of independent contrac-
tors. Clause two specifies which works arising out of a non-em-
ployee relationship may be works made for hire. As a result, the
broad presumption of the 1909 Act8 5 that initial ownership auto-
hire." Other works made on special order or commission would not
come within the definition.
See supra note 1, delineating the nine specified categories: (1) contributions to collective
works; (2) parts of motion pictures or audiovisual works; (3) translations; (4) supplemen-
tary works; (5) compilations; (6) instructional tests; (7) tests; (8) answer materials for
tests; (9) atlases.
79 See supra note 1.
80 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1982) (Historical and Revision Notes: House Rep. No. 94-
1476) ("Section 201 (b) ... adopts one of the basic principles of the present law: that in
the case of works made for hire the employer is considered the author of the work, and
is regarded as the initial owner of copyright unless there has been an agreement other-
wise."). Section 201(b) reads:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of
this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a
written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in
the copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
81 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (1982); see supra note 1.
82 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1982); see supra note 1.
83 See supra notes 53-79 and accompanying text.
84 See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
85 See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
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matically vests in the employer has been limited to traditional em-
ployer-employee relationships under clause one and extends to
commissioned works only in limited instances under clause two.86
The definition of works made for hire in section 101,87 com-
bined with the assignment of ownership in section 201,88 appear to
institute a straightforward dichotomy between traditional employees
and employers and independent contractors and commissioning
parties. Section 101 defines a work made for hire as one "prepared
by an employee within the scope of his or her employment" or one
of nine categories of "work specially ordered or commissioned."
Under section 201, "the employer or other person for whom the
work was prepared" shall be considered the author of a work for
hire for copyright purposes.
The statutory division between "employee-employer" and
"work specially ordered or commissioned-other person for whom
the work was prepared" first appears simple to apply. The cases
decided after the 1976 Act took effect on January 1, 1978 indicate,
however, that some federal courts are unwilling to take sections 101
and 201 at face value. In an effort to determine which commis-
sioned works constitute works made for hire, courts have developed
two interpretations of clause two of section 101: Congress either
intended clause two to be the exclusive test for commissioned works
or it intended clause two to act as a mere safeguard for those nine
specified types of works by requiring both parties to sign a writing
designating the work as one made for hire.81'
86 See supra note 77. The definition in section 201 specifically allows the parties to
allocate ownership rights through a written agreement. The 1909 Act did not allow this
type of allocation. See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text; see also Yardley v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 44 (2d Cir. 1939) (presumption that copyrights are
assigned to the commissioning party under the contract), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686
(1940).
87 See supra note 1.
88 See supra note 80.
89 It is important to note the consequences of a work for hire determination under
the 1976 Act to understand what rights are at stake.
Three important changes were made in the Act that affect the treatment of works
made for hire. First, the 1976 Act lengthens the duration of copyright in "anonymous
works, pseudonymous works and works made for hire" from the maximum term of 56
years from publication under the 1909 Act to a term of "seventy-five years from the year
of its first publication, or a term of one hundred years from the year of its creation,
whichever expires first." 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1982). This alternative term is "roughly
equivalent" to works that are not made for hire whose copyright "subsists from its crea-
tion and ... endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 50 years after his
death." 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982). The reason for the alternative term is to encourage
publication of these works by placing a 100-year limitation on the duration of the copy-
right if the work is not published.
Second, the author's right to terminate transfers and licenses of copyright is not
applicable to works made for hire. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1982). This same rule applies for
termination of transfers and licenses covering subsisting copyrights. The result of these
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II
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976:
CURRENT CASE LAW
A. The "Non-Exclusive" Interpretation
The "non-exclusive" interpretation of the 1976 Act's definition
of works made for hire represents the conservative position that
copyright law, as it pertains to works made for hire, is essentially the
same as under the 1909 Act. This interpretation holds that clause
two of section 101 is not the exclusive test for determining whether
commissioned work constitutes work made for hire. Rather, a spe-
cially ordered or commissioned work outside of the nine categories
of clause two can still qualify as a work for hire under clause one if
the commissioning party exercises control over the work. The pro-
ponents of this view9° argue that the nine specified categories were
problem areas that required the additional safeguard of a writing
signed by both parties. They claim that as to all other categories of
commissioned works, the law as it existed prior to January 1, 1978
has not changed. Therefore, if a commissioning party actually con-
trols an independent contractor, the latter assumes the status of an
employee under agency law and his work is treated as a work made
for hire under clause one of section 101.
1. The Leading Case: Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.
In 1984, the Second Circuit formulated a new standard for de-
termining whether a work was made for hire. The court in Aldon
Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.91 held that an employer-employee rela-
tionship could be found where the employee "was not a regular or
formal employee," 92 if the employer actually supervised and con-
trolled the work production. The Aldon Accessories standard restricts
the effect of clause two to only those nine categories listed.
In Aldon Accessories, the plaintiff commissioned a company to de-
sign statuettes that Spiegel, the defendant, subsequently copied.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court erroneously
interpreted clause two of section 101 when it instructed thejury that
A work for hire is a work prepared by what the law calls an em-
two sections is that the copyright to a work made for hire will not revert to the employee
or independent contractor.
Third, the right to renew the copyright vests in the employer. 17 U.S.C. § 304(d)
(1982). Thus, the employer, rather than the independent contractor or employee, or
their representatives has the right to renew subsisting copyrights for a renewal term of
forty-seven years.
90 See infra notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
91 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
92 Id. at 552.
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ployee working within the scope of his employment. What that
means is, a person acting under the direction and supervision of
the hiring author, at the hiring author's instance and expense. It
does not matter whether the for-hire creator is an employee in the
sense of having a regular job with the hiring author. What mat-
ters is whether the hiring author caused the work to be made and
exercised the right to direct and supervise the creation.9 3
Affirming the decision below, 9 4 the Second Circuit found that
clause two did not apply to this situation. The court framed the is-
sue in terms of whether the contractor was "independent" or was so
controlled and supervised by the employing party when creating the
work that an employer-employee relationship existed.9 5 In deter-
mining the status of the contractor, the court focused on the terms
"employee" and "scope of employment" in clause one. The court
determined that, because the Act did not define those terms, Con-
gress intended courts to interpret those terms using general agency
law principles as applied in prior copyright cases. 9 6 Relying on the
supervision and control test rooted in the cases interpreting the
1909 Act, the court held that these commissioned artists were tradi-
tional employees under clause one of section 101 because the work
was made at the hiring party's instance and expense and because the
hiring party exercised the right to direct and control the creation.9 7
2. Circuit Court Cases Supporting the Non-Exclusive Interpretation
Other circuits have adopted the Aldon Accessories "non-exclu-
sive" interpretation. In Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Systems
Software,98 the parties agreed that the defendant would develop a
computer program for Project Basic, a program used by educational
institutions. After completing its work on the program, the defend-
ant attempted to market its own manual and computer program to
compete with Project Basic. Relying on Aldon Accessories, the Seventh
Circuit found that section 101 of the 1976 Act retained the 1909
Act's flexible definition of the term "employee."-99 The court held
that because the defendant was an employee of the plaintiff under
agency principles, the copyright vested in the plaintiff as a work for
hire employer.' 0 0
93 Id. at 551.
94 Id. at 549.
95 Id. at 552.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cer. denied, Chicago Systems Software ,. Evans Newton,
Inc., 479 U.S. 949 (1986).
99 Id. at 894.
100 Id.
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The Aldon Accessories interpretation recently gained further sup-
port from the Fourth Circuit. In Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock ,101 a
newspaper sued a competitor for copyright infringement arising out
of the competitor's publication of advertisements designed by plain-
tiff's employees. The Fourth Circuit held that clause two of section
101 is "permissive only and.., effective only if both parties execute
a written agreement that the work is for hire."' 10 2 Relying on clause
one of section 101, the court used general agency law to determine
that the newspaper whose employees prepared the ads owned the
copyright in those ads unless it signed a written agreement with the
advertiser stating that the work was for hire. 10 3
B. The "Exclusive" Interpretation
The "exclusive" interpretation of the work for hire definition in
the 1976 Act reinforces the notion of compromise embodied in the
Act. 10 4 Under this interpretation, Congress' definition of works
made for hire fundamentally changed the copyright law pertaining
to independent contractors. The advocates of this interpretation
consider clause two the exclusive test for determining whether an
independent contractor's work was for hire. 10 5 Thus, the only com-
missioned works that qualify for work for hire status with its attend-
ant legal consequences are those nine specified types of work in
clause two. Moreover, those nine categories are considered works
made for hire only if accompanied by a writing signed by both par-
ties designating the work as for hire.
1. The Leading Case: Easter Seal Society v. Playboy
Enterprises
In Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of Louisiana,
Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises,106 the plaintiff contracted with a public tele-
vision station to videotape a Mardi Gras-style parade to be used for
the National Easter Seal Telethon. Without any idea of the buyer's
101 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1987).
102 Id. at 413.
103 Id.
104 See supra notes 51-79 and accompanying text.
105 See NIMMER, supra note 8, § 5.03[B], at 5-19, 5-20 ("If a work does not fall within
one of the above categories then even if it has been prepared by one person upon the
special order or commission of another, it will not qualify as a 'work made for hire,' with
the special legal consequences which flow from this designation"). In discussing the
narrowing effect of the 1976 Act on the rights of commissioning parties, Nimmer distin-
guishes the 1909 Act since, under the former Act, "a commissioning party could claim
copyright as against the independent contractor regardless of whether or not the work
fell within one of the prescribed categories of works discussed above." Id. at 5-22.2.
106 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir.), rehg denied, 820 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988).
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intended use, the public television station sold the plaintiff's foot-
age to a Canadian filmmaker who used it in the production of an
adult film entitled Candy, the Stripper. Easter Seal sued Playboy, the
producer of Candy, for copyright infringement. The court deter-
mined that the public television station who produced the original
footage was not Easter Seal's "employee" within the 1976 Act's
work for hire doctrine; hence, the television station owned the copy-
right to the footage. 10 7
In Easter Seal, the Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected Aldon Accesso-
ries' non-exclusive interpretation of the work for hire definition. 10 8
The Court held that a work is made for hire under clause one of
section 101 only if the seller is an employee within the meaning of
agency law or under clause two if the buyer and seller comply with
that clause's three requirements. 10 9 The court determined that
clause two reversed the 1909 Act's presumption that any person
who paid another to create a work automatically became the statu-
tory author of that work. 1 0
2. Circuit Court Cases Supporting the Exclusive Interpretation
Recently, the District of Columbia and Ninth Circuits adopted
the exclusive interpretation of clause two of the work for hire defini-
tion. In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, ' " I the plaintiff
hired Reid to sculpt three people with a shopping cart of belong-
ings, symbolizing the plight of the homeless, for use in the annual
Christmas Pageant of Peace in the District of Columbia. '12 The
plaintiff specified the subject matter of and materials to be used in
the sculpting, assumed responsibility for creating an adjunct base
for the sculpting, financed the entire project, and monitored the de-
velopment of the piece.' 1' After the Pageant, Reid took possession
of the sculpture to repair it and then refused to deliver the sculpture
back to the plaintiff for a tour of several cities." 14 He filed a certifi-
cate of copyright in March 1986 and arranged to display the sculp-
ture in a less ambitious tour of his own design. Plaintiff filed a
competing certificate of copyright in June 1986. The district court,
relying on agency standards, developed in cases dealing with works
made for hire under the 1909 Act, held that the work for hire doc-
trine applied to this case and rendered judgment in favor of the
107 Id. at 334-36.
108 Id. at 333-34.
109 Id. at 334-35.
1 1o Id. at 335.
111 846 F.2d 1485, (D.C. Cir.) aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
112 Id. at 1487.
i : Id. The sculptor, Reid, donated his services to the organization.
'14 Id. at 1488.
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plaintiff. 15
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the case
law developed under the 1909 Act did not apply to commissioned
works under clause two of the 1976 Act." t6 The court specifically
rejected the Aldon Accessories interpretation and adopted the Easter
Seal interpretation.' 17 Applying the exclusive interpretation, the
court stated:
It follows from this that "Third World America" does not qualify
as a work made for hire, for Reid was an independent contractor
and not an employee of CCNV within the rules of agency law; 118
furthermore, sculpture surely is not a category of commissioned
work enumerated in § 101(2), and no written agreement existed
between CCNV and Reid.' '9
The Ninth Circuit first construed the work for hire provisions of
the 1976 Act in Dumas v. Gommerman.120 In Dumas, the widow of a
graphic artist claimed that her husband was an independent contrac-
tor when he created the works in question. As such, she contended
that under the 1976 Act he retained the copyright to those works
and, upon his death, she assumed the copyrights as his successor in
interest.'21 The defendant, appealing from a preliminary injunction
restraining it from reproducing and marketing the works, contended
that the late artist was an employee of the company from which the
defendant purchased the copies and copyrights of the remaining
works. The plaintiff, upon learning of the defendant's acquisition,
notified them of her copyright claim and filed a registration of
copyright.
115 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1457 (D.D.C. 1987).
116 Reid, 846 F.2d at 1494.
''7 Id. at 1489-94.
118 The court noted that
Reid, a fine artist, donated his services, worked in his own studio, and
personally engaged assistants when he needed them. Creating sculptures
was hardly 'regular business' for CCNV. Given these matters of fact, see
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (1958), we think it evident that
Reid was not CCNV's employee, nor do we understand CCNV to contend
otherwise.
Id. at 1494 n.11.
11!) Id. at 1494. Having resolved the work for hire issue, the court addressed the
possibility that Reid was not the exclusive author of the work. The court found that
"were it not for the prevailing confusion over the work for hire doctrine, this case...
might qualify as a textbook example of a jointly-authored work in which the joint au-
thors co-own the copyright." Id. at 1497.
120 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit had anticipated its interpreta-
tion of the 1976 Act in Ma' V. Morganelli, Henmnann & Assocs., 618 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir.
1980). There the court indicated in dicta that, had the 1976 Act applied to that case, it
would have followed the literal interpretation of the Act. Id. at 1368 n.4; see also infra
note 130 and accompanying text.
121 Id. at 1094.
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On appeal, the court considered only whether the district court
applied the correct legal standard in determining whether the artist
was an employee or independent contractor under the 1976 Act. 1'22
After a thorough discussion of the history of both the 1909 Act and
the 1976 Act, 123 the court concluded that "only the works produced
by formal, salaried employees are covered by . .. § 101 (1). Only
certain types of specially commissioned works qualify as 'work made
for hire' under § 101(2) .... Therefore .... [these works] are not
'works made for hire.' "124
The court discussed the division between those Circuits favor-
ing the Aldon Accessories interpretation 125 and those favoring the
Easter Seal interpretation. 26 The court rejected the Aldon Accessories
interpretation, noting that such an analysis "simply fails to acknowl-
edge the changes wrought by the 1976 Act .... misapprehends the
significance of legislative silence in the context of the development
of the 1976 Act," 127 "distorts the balance reached in the 1965 com-
promise"' 128 and "undercuts the intent of the drafters of § 101 to
increase certainty over whether a work is made for hire." 121
3. Other Support for the Exclusive Interpretation
The first cases addressing the 1976 Act's definition of works
made for hire did so primarily in dicta, and generally tended to
favor the "exclusive" interpretation of section 101.130 The first de-
cision to discuss the legislative background of the Act and its work
for hire provision was Mister B Textiles, Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc. 131
In Iister B, a textile company sought a preliminary injunction to
prevent the defendant fabric manufacturer from selling certain
fabrics allegedly infringing the plaintiff's copyrighted fabrics. An
122 Id. at 1095.
123 Id. at 1096-1101.
124 Id. at 1105. The court adopted the Easter Seal literal interpretation, id. at 1102-
05, but rejected its conclusion not to limit the term "employee" to formal, salaried em-
ployees. Id. at 1105.
125 See supra notes 9 1-103 and accompanying text.
126 Id. at 1103-05; see supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
127 Id. at 1102.
128 Id. at 1103.
129 Id.
130 See, e.g., May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assocs., 618 F.2d 1363, 1368 n.4 (9th
Cir. 1980) (under the 1976 Act, plaintiff-architect would have been an independent con-
tractor, not an employee, so under section 101 of the 1976 Act, his drawings would not
have been subject to the work for hire doctrine because of the absence of a written
agreement so providing and because the drawings did not fall within one of the pre-
scribed categories of work); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 854-855 (D.NJ. 1981)
(architectural drawings not considered works for hire under the 1976 Act because they
were not among the nine specified categories).
1'1 523 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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independent contractor designed the fabrics for the plaintiff com-
pany. The defendant argued that the revised work for hire doctrine
in section 101 of the Act would operate in an independent contrac-
tor relationship only if the work is one of the nine specified types in
clause two.' 32 Because the fabric design did not fall within any of
those categories, the defendant argued that the independent con-
tractor owned the copyright as the statutory author and the plaintiff
could not now claim the copyright without a written transfer of
rights from the independent contractor.'33
Indicating an initial preference for the exclusive interpretation
of the work for hire definition, the court observed that the statute
and legislative history supported the defendant's argument. 134 In
deciding the ownership issue, however, the court found dispositive
the fact that the independent contractor created the work "with the
participation of" plaintiff's employee and under her "direction."13 5
The court theorized that the plaintiff's employee was a joint owner
of the copyright with the independent contractor.' 36 Because the
work for hire doctrine as applied to the traditional employer-em-
ployee relationship remained intact under clause one, the owner-
ship rights of the plaintiff's employee passed directly to the plaintiff,
making it joint owner of the copyright. 137
Since the 1976 Act took effect, the federal courts have not re-
solved the proper application of the work for hire doctrine to in-
dependent contractors. The Aldon Accessories court attempted to
maintain the flexibility of the 1909 Act by adopting an "actual con-
trol" standard for applying the work for hire doctrine to independ-
ent contractor situations. 138  Easter Seal, on the other hand,
established a per se rule under which only works within the nine cate-
gories of work enumerated in clause two can be considered works
made for hire in an independent contractor situation, and even
132 Id. at 24.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 24-25.
136 Id. at 25.
137 The "exclusive" interpretation advanced by the defendant and accepted by the
court as accurate in Mister B continued to influence courts in their interpretation of the
1976 work for hire provisions. See, e.g., Everts v. Arkham House Publishers, Inc., 579 F.
Supp. 145, 148 (W.D. Wis. 1984) ("... if the 1976 statute was applicable, the admitted
lack of a written agreement between the parties and the type of work involved here (a
book of poetry written by a single author) would summarily dispose of Everts' work-for-
hire argument and his claim to the copyright"); Childers v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc.,
557 F. Supp. 978, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (even if a work falls within a specified category, it
will not be considered a work for hire unless the parties agree in writing that the work is
such).
1 8 See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
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then, only if the parties agree in writing.' 39 While the courts in both
these cases sought to resolve much of the confusion, they merely
crystallized the dichotomy between the two interpretations of sec-
tion 101.
III
RESOLVING THE ISSUE
The definition of works made for hire in the Copyright Act of
1976 represents over two decades of legislative hearings and nu-
merous revisions. Lacking expertise in the copyright field, Congress
relied heavily on the recommendations of experts in copyright law
and groups economically interested in the copyright law revision.
The result is a series of compromises of those multiple concerns.140
Although these compromises created facial ambiguities in section
101, the legislative history reveals that Congress intended to radi-
cally change the existing law.
A. The Constitutional Implications of the 1976 Act's
Definition of Works Made For Hire
A work for hire determination necessarily raises constitutional
concerns. The Copyright Clause strives to protect and thereby mo-
tivate the individual whose creativity produces a work that will en-
hance the culture and development of society.' 4 ' Copyrights should
vest, therefore, in those from whom the creativity of the project is
derived. Theoretically, treating the employer in an employer-em-
ployee relationship as the "author" in the case of work made for
hire is consistent with the policy behind the Copyright Clause. 142
Because the work for hire employer conceives of the project, in-
structs the employee, participates actively and regularly in its pro-
duction, and assumes the financial risks, it is fair to consider the
employer the "author" for copyright purposes. 43
139 See supra note I; see also supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
140 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 11 and 12 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho-
graphing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) ("[A] very modest grade of art has in it some-
thing irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something he may copyright unless
there is a restriction in the words of the act."). "The right to useful inventions seems ...
to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides ... with the claims of indi-
viduals." The Federalist, No. 43, at 278, quoted in Copyright Law Revision, Studies 1-4,
Derenberg, Study No. 3, The Meaning of "Writings" in the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution 61, at 70 (1956); see also supra notes 11 and 12 and accompanying text.
143 See, e.g., Aldon Accessories, Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 553 (2d Cir.)
(employer's supervision and direction of employee conclusive in finding that employer
owned copyright), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); see supra notes 30-32 and accompany-
ing text.
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In the nine specified categories of commissioned works listed in
clause two of section 101, the same considerations are evident. In
those categories, the publisher or producer is responsible for the
concept, the selection of included pieces, the compilation of the
parts into the whole, any revision and updating, as well as the fi-
nancing. Given the involvement of publishers and producers, in-
cluding specific composite works in the definition of works made for
hire is consistent with the purpose underlying the Copyright Clause.
The "non-exclusive" interpretation and its "actual control"
standard, however, contradict that basic purpose of the Copyright
Clause. Such an interpretation ignores the Copyright Office Revi-
sory Committee's conclusion that some commissioned works should
never be considered works made for hire.144 Such works, according
to the Revisory Committee, find their creative base deep within the
artist or author and not with the commissioning party, regardless of
the level of control exercised.' 45 To treat these works as works
made for hire under a strict application of the "actual control" stan-
dard would be to vest the copyright in an individual who is not the
creator. Thus, this interpretation extends the work for hire doctrine
well beyond its constitutional limits by protecting, at the creator's
expense, an individual who is not truly the author.
B. The Congressional Intent Behind the Definition of Works
Made For Hire
The preliminary draft of the copyright law revision defined
works made for hire specifically to exclude all "works made on spe-
cial order or commission."'46 When this exclusion raised strenuous
opposition from publishers and motion picture companies, Con-
gress retreated, amending the definition of works made for hire to
include specially ordered or commissioned works if expressly
agreed to in writing that the work would be considered a work made
for hire.' 47 At this point in the revision process, any and all commis-
sioned works could constitute works made for hire if the parties so
agreed.
However, artists' groups vehemently opposed such a sweeping
enlargement of the work for hire doctrine.' 48 They sought to nar-
row the scope of the definition from treating all specially commis-
sioned works as potential works for hire to treating as potential
144 COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PT. 6, supra note 49, at 67 ("[Tlhere are many works
... that are written 'on special order or commission' but that should not be regarded as
works made for hire.' "); see also supra notes 70 and 71 and accompanying text.
145 Id.
146 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
147 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
148 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
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works for hire only "composite work[s] in which the producer
brings together the efforts of many creative skills and talents and
merges them in a new work."' 4 9 To reconcile the business needs of
the publishing and motion picture industries with artists' needs for
protection from the potential abuses of unequal bargaining
strength, the Revisory Committee effected a compromise in the
1965 Revision Bill.150 The compromise satisfied the publishers and
producers by maintaining commissioned works in the definition, but
also satisfied authors and artists by limiting those commissioned
works eligible for work for hire status. 15 1
It is clear from these legislative hearings and commentaries that
Congress intended the second clause of section 101 to serve as the
exclusive test for determining whether a commissioned work was
made for hire. Had Congress intended to retain the 1909 Act's
more expansive treatment of commissioned works, as the "non-ex-
clusive" interpretation holds, it would have adopted the 1964 defini-
tion.152 The legislative history reveals that the discontent among
authors and artists over an all-encompassing definition caused the
subsequent refinement of the definition to include only those cate-
gories where a work for hire relationship effectuates the purpose of
the Copyright Clause, to motivate the party who most truly repre-
sents the creative force behind a given project.'53
1. The "Exclusive" View 154
The 1976 Act's legislative history emphasized the difficulties of
determining which commissioned works should be treated as works
made for hire: "The basic problem is how to draw a statutory line
between those works written on special order or commission that
should be considered as 'works made for hire,' and those that
should not."155The Committee hearings stressed the importance of
determining which "works" should be considered commissioned
works under clause two of section 101. The emphasis was on the
actual type of work, not on who prepared the work, the manner in
which it was prepared or under what conditions it was prepared.
For example, the 1965 Revision Bill conceded that some works, like
composer music and choreography, although they are commis-
149 COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PT. 3, supra note 55, at 274 (comments by Invin Karp,
representing Authors League of America).
150 See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
151 See supra text accompanying note 150.
152 See supra notes 64 and 148 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 11-13, 16-18, 142-44 and accompanying text.
154 See supra notes 104-39 and accompanying text.
155 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976).
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sioned, should not constitute works made for hire.1 56 As a result,
clause two does not apply to choreographic artists even though such
artists are generally commissioned for a specific job. 157
This shift in inquiry from "who prepared the work?" to "what
type of work is involved?" is significant. It reflects Congress's intent
to exclude independent contractors' work from work for hire status
unless they fall within one of the nine specified categories in clause
two of section 101. For example, the Act treats both staff writers
and commissioned writers for a motion picture equally. Because the
project fits one of clause two's specified categories, the copyrights to
the finished screenplay vest in the motion picture production com-
pany regardless of whether the writer was a regular employee or a
commissioned writer.15 8
2. The "Non-Exclusive" View
The "non-exclusive" interpretation' 59 violates Congress's in-
tent to apply the work for hire doctrine only to specified commis-
sioned works. Under the "non-exclusive" interpretation, any
commissioned work can be treated as if made for hire under clause
one if, applying agency law standards, the independent contractor is
the equivalent of an "employee."' 60 However, the standards of the
1909 Act' 6 ' are present in virtually every commissioned situation:
the work is always at the commissioning party's instance and ex-
pense and the commissioning party always retains some control.
Applying such an interpretation would result in treating every com-
missioned work as one made for hire-even those commissioned
works Congress specifically excluded from the definition.' 62
The Aldon Accessories court 163 probably realized this potential
outcome because it held that the mere "right to control" was an
insufficient basis for finding an employer-employee relationship.
The court determined that Congress intended courts "to look at the
156 COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, Pr. 6, supra note 49, at 67.
157 Id.
158 Moreover, staff personnel can lose any claim to a copyright under either clause
one, because they are employees working within the scope of their employment, or
clause two, because they are working on one of the specified types of works. Independ-
ent contractors, by definition, are excluded from clause one. They can only lose a claim
to a copyright under clause two. Thus, in this example, they can only lose their copy-
right if they also signed a writing designating their work as work for hire.
159 See supra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
160 See supra note 93-97 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
162 See supra note 145.
163 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); see also supra notes 91-97
and accompanying text.
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general law of agency as applied by prior copyright cases."' 64 Ironi-
cally, though purporting to apply prior case law, the court formu-
lated a whole new standard of "actual control."' 165 Under this
stricter standard, the commissioning party must actually exercise
control over the independent contractor in order to convert the in-
dependent contractor into an "employee" for purposes of charac-
terizing work as made for hire pursuant to clause one of section
101's work for hire definition. 166
The Aldon Accessories agency test is flawed because it treats any
commissioned work outside of clause two's nine specified categories
as a work for hire whenever the commissioning party plays an active
role in the project. Such an interpretation of clause one introduces
a huge loophole in clause two's limitation of categories of commis-
sioned works that can be treated as works for hire. The Copyright
Office specifically addressed this problem during its revision pro-
cess, citing it as one of the major reasons for limiting the categories
of commissioned works. 167 In deciding which types of commis-
sioned works are made for hire, Congress selected only those types
where "the distinction between 'employment' or 'commission' is
fundamentally meaningless."'' 68 For the courts to expand the work
for hire definition by interpreting commissioned relationships in
light of general agency law, when Congress has already spoken, vio-
lates the express legislative design of the statute.
C. Co-Authorship versus Work For Hire Status
The "non-exclusive" interpretation extends the work for hire
doctrine to commissioned works beyond clause two's specified cate-
gories whenever the commissioning party exercises "actual control"
over the project. Carrying this proposition to its logical conclusion,
however, the work should not be considered a work for hire and the
commissioning party should not be the sole "author" of the work
under the work for hire doctrine. Rather, under the 1976 Act, the
project is a joint work' 69 with the commissioning party at best be-
coming a joint author with the independent contractor. 170
164 Id. at 552.
165 Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 333 (5th Cir. 1987).
166 Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552-53. See supra text accompanying note 91.
167 COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PT. 6, supra note 49, at 67-68.
168 See supra note 77.
169 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976). Section 201 (a) defines
a joint work as one "prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their con-
tributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." The
1976 Act emphasizes the intent of the authors at the time of their respective
contributions.
170 See, e.g., Mister B Textiles, Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 21
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (as one of the authors of a joint work by participating in its creation,
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Differential treatment of commissioning parties under the op-
posing interpretations is clear in Aldon Accessories and Mister B Textiles,
Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc. 171 In each case the court faced a situa-
tion where an "exclusive" interpretation of the statute would result
in unjustly enriching a third party infringer. The Mister B court
groped to justify finding a work for hire relationship. It determined
that because an employee of the plaintiff had exercised sufficient
control over the work, she was a co-author of the end product. As a
co-author, the copyrights vested in the plaintiff's employee as a ten-
ant in common with the independent contractor. In turn, as a tradi-
tional employee, her copyrights passed to her employer under
clause one of section 101.172
The Aldon Accessories court faced the same dilemma but arrived
at a contrasting result. Like the court in Mister B, the Aldon Accessories
court looked at the level of control exercised by the commissioning
party. In Aldon Accessories, however, the court determined that the
exercise of "actual control" rendered the independent contractor an
employee of the commissioning party. The Mister B court, on the
other hand, determined that sufficient control rendered the commis-
sioning party a co-author.
Mister B's result is more harmonious with the other sections of
the Act dealing with the issue of ownership. One main premise of
the work for hire doctrine is that the parties intend at the time of
contracting that the work shall be made for hire.' 73 Requiring both
parties to sign a writing specifying their intent that the work be
made for hire attempts to prevent abuse of the doctrine. Thus,
under the "non-exclusive" interpretation, a commissioned work not
designated a work for hire at the time of contracting may be con-
verted thereafter by the commissioning party's exercise of "actual
control" in the production process. Such exploitation of the artist is
exactly the result many authors and artists' groups participating in
commissioning party was ajoint owner of the work), Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir.) (there existed "various indicia of the parties'
intent, from the outset, to merge their contributions into a unitary whole, and not to
construct and separately preserve discrete parts as independent works"), aft'd, 109 S. Ct.
2166 (1989); see also NIMMER, supra note 8, § 5.03[B], at 5-20:
Moreover, even if the work is prepared on commission, and there is no
written instrument as between the parties, if in addition to commission-
ing the work, the commissioning party also materially contributed as an
author to the creation of the work, he may be held to be a joint author
together with the independent contractor.
171 See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
173 See NIMMER, supra note 8, § 5.03[B], at 5-21 (determining in whom the copyright
in commissioned works vested has always depended on the intention of the parties,
whenever that intention was ascertainable.
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the copyright law revisions feared. 174 A primary reason that clause
two of section 101 was limited to nine categories and required a
written designation of the work for hire intentions of the parties was
precisely to eliminate the potential for such abuse.
CONCLUSION
Congress revised the Copyright Act to better achieve the basic
constitutional purpose of the Copyright Clause: to provide protec-
tion for authors as an incentive to continue producing works that
enhance the culture, learning, and development of society. Con-
gress revived that purpose when it refined the definition of works
made for hire to include only specified categories of commissioned
works. The legislative history of the redrafting process reveals that
the actual control standard advocated by proponents of the "non-
exclusive" interpretation expands the categories of commissioned
works beyond that envisioned by the Copyright Office's Revisory
Committee or that intended by Congress. Rather, the "exclusive"
interpretation, limiting work for hire eligibility of specially ordered
or commissioned works to nine codified categories and requiring a
signed written instrument acknowledging the parties' intentions to
create a work made for hire, best effectuates both Congress's intent
and the underlying purpose of the Copyright Clause.
Anne Marie Hill
174 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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